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Introduction
FRANKIE FOOK-LUN LEUNG*
I grew up, was educated through college, practiced and taught
law in Hong Kong. Since leaving Hong Kong, I have kept up both
emotionally and professionally with the developments there
Clearly, the next most dramatic event for Hong Kong will take
place on July 1, 1997 when Hong Kong will return to the People's
Republic of China (PRC).
Many academics and commentators have written extensively
about the transfer (or resumption) of sovereignty of Hong Kong
by the PRC.2 As expected, many legal, social, political, and eco-
* Partner, Lewis D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard. Adjunct Professor in Chinese
Law, Loyola Law School. Former lecturer in Chinese Law, Stanford Law School. For-
merly part-time lecturer in Chinese Law, Hong Kong University, Faculty of Law.
1. See Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Introductory Note, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, 35 I.L.M. 207 (1996); Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Intro-
ductory Note, United States: United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 32 I.L.M 545
(1993).
2. See BRUCE BUENO DE MESUITA, RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG (1996);
MICHAEL YAHUDA, HONG KONG: CHINA'S CHALLENGE (1996); THE FUTURE OF
HONG KONG: TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND (Hungdah Chiu et al. eds., 1987); HONG
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nomic issues impact the transfer of sovereignty; likewise, the trans-
fer will impact many, if not all, aspects of life in Hong Kong. I
need not dwell on each specific issue impacting the transfer, or
each impact of the transfer, as the ensuing Articles articulate vari-
ous problems that the new Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) will encounter. In all areas of law that the
transfer affects, the HKSAR will consistently have to tackle two
concerns: (1). the lasting effects of British rule on the HKSAR;
and (2) the interpretation of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the
PRC,3 which will essentially serve as the HKSAR's constitution af-
ter July 1, 1997.
The transfer of sovereignty from Great Britain to the PRC
presents fascinating issues for lawyers.4 First, how will the PRC
deal with remnants of British rule in Hong Kong? Putting it in
somewhat journalistic terms, the PRC has accused the British gov-
ernment of implementing major changes in Hong Kong during the
transitional period. For example, the British recently introduced
popular elections into the Legislative Council by enlarging the en-
franchised population. Such drastic changes are analogous to an
outgoing owner of property, who knowing that he has to surrender
the property, intentionally decides to make major structural al-
terations that the successor in title does not approve.
In iesponse to the PRC's allegations, the British counter-
argument is simply that it can do whatever is not expressly prohib-
ited in the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong, which sets out the guidelines governing the transfer.5 Sec-
ondly, the British government argues that its changes foster in the
community a sense of democratic participation and a respect for
the rule of law before the transfer of sovereignty, and that this type
of atmosphere is the most effective way to ensure a high degree of
KONG'S TRANSITION: A DECADE AFTER THE DEAL (Wang Gungwu & Wong Siu-lun
eds., 1995).
3. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519 [hereinafter Basic Law].
4. See THE FUTURE OF THE LAW IN HONO KONG (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989).
5. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1371 [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
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autonomy in the HKSAR post-1997.
The British attempt to implement what it deems most desir-
able for Hong Kong has expectedly met with strong reaction from
the PRC. The PRC has declared that Legislative Councilors who
were elected at the 1995 elections will have, to step down on June
30, 1997, thereby virtually nullifying the effect of the recent demo-
cratic elections.6 Furthermore, as of December 1996, the PRC set
up a provisional legislative assembly to bridge the hiatus created
by the derailment of the 1995 elected legislature.7
The second general problem that the HKSAR will have to
tackle concerns the very document that will serve as its written
constitution: the Basic Law." Commentators, including myself,
envision that the legislative interpretation of many articles in the
Basic Law will present problems to lawyers who are trained and
experience in the common law tradition.9
For example, article 18 of the Basic Law reads:
The laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be this [Basic] Law, the laws previously in force in
Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this [Basic] Law, and
the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region.
National laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special'
Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex III to
this [Basic] Law ....
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
may add to or delete from the lists of laws in Annex III after
consulting its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and the government of the Re-
gion ....
In the event that the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by rea-
6. See Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for the Formation
of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 7th National People's Cong., 3d Sess.
7. See Yash Ghai, Back to Basic: The Provisional Legislature and the Basic Law, 25
H.K. LJ. 2 (1995); Stephen Law Shing-Yan, The Constitutionality of the Provisional Legis-
lature, 26 H.K. LJ. 152 (1996).
8. Basic Law, supra note 3, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990).
9. See C. LOH, HONG KONG: A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY AND THE BASIC
LAW (1995); INTERNATIONAL CQMM'N OF JURISTS, COUNTDOWN TO 1997: REPORT OF
A MISSION TO HONG KONG (1992).
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son of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region which endangers national unity or security and is be-
yond the control of the government of the Region, decides that
the Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People's Gov-
ernment may issue an order applying the relevant national laws
in the Region.'0
Simply stated, the PRC still reserves a set of constitutional super-
visory powers to apply laws promulgated in its communistic ideo-
logical framework to capitalistic Hong Kong, pursuant to the
"state of emergency" provision." This broad reservation has
caused much concern in Hong Kong. Many dread the day when,
for example, the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure will be in-
troduced and applied in Hong Kong's courts pursuant to the "state
of emergency" provision.1
2
Article 19 of the Basic Law also presents a potential interpre-
tational problem. Under its provisions, although the Hong Kong
judiciary has independent judiciary power, including the power of
final adjudication, this power is qualified. The article continues to
state that "the courts of the [HKSAR] shall have no jurisdiction
over acts of state such as defence and foreign 0affairs."' 3 Since the
Basic Law's promulgation, the PRC has indicated that the words
"such as" indicate that defense and foreign affairs are simply two
examples of state activities over which the Hong Kong judiciary
does not have jurisdiction. The exact ambit of those activities still
remains undefined. 4
Article 158 of the Basic Law introduces yet another concern.' 5
Article 158 vests in the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress [SCNPC] the power to interpret the Basic Law.
Thus, if HKSAR courts need to interpret the Basic Law concern-
ing affairs that are the responsibility of the Central Government or
10. Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 18, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1523 (1990).
11. Id.
12. See LOH, supra note 9; see also A. Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View of a
Hong Kong Lawyer, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 309 (1991-1992).
13. Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 19, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519,1523 (1990).
14. See Xiao Weiyun, A Study of the Political System of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region Under the Basic Law, 2 J. CmNESE L. 95, 112 (1988); Wu Jianfan,
Several Issues Concerning the Relationship Between the Central Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J. CHINESE
L. 66, 67-9 (1988).
15. See INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 9, at 113.
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concerning the relationship between the Central Government and.
the HKSAR, they must seek an interpretation of the relevant
provisions from the SCNPC. Before giving the court an interpre-
tation, the SCNPC must consult its Committee for the Basic Law
of the HKSAR. In effect, HKSAR courts must seek a legislative
interpretation of the law, which will serve as a basis for final non-
appealable judgments.
It is a common and accepted practice in civil law jurisdictions
that the legislature has the power to interpret laws.'6 In common
law jurisdictions, however, the judiciary is exclusively given the
constitutional power to interpret all laws. Many fear that article
158, together with other provisions of the Basic Law, purports to
encroach upon and undermine the independence of HKSAR
courts in deciding cases that bear on governmental powers."
To conclude, while Hong Kong is undergoing an unprece-
dented transfer of sovereignty, I, like many others, anticipate that
many of the changes will have unsettling effects on Hong Kong's
legal system. The following Articles explain some of those effects,
discuss possible difficulties that will accompany the transfer of
sovereignty, and a few even offer solutions.
16. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed.
1985). In contrast to the civil law practice, and with special reference to Hong Kong, see
BERRY Hsu, THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM IN CHINESE CONTEXT: HONG KONG IN
TRANSITION (1992). See also PETER WESLEY-SMITH, THE SOURCES OF HONG KONG
LAW (1994).
17. See Gladys Li, Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Interpretation of the
Basic Law-A High Degree of Autocracy?, Speech at a Far Eastern Economic Review
conference (1996) (transcript on file with the author).
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